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Abstract 
The general idea is to follow the Varieties-of-Capitalism literature on generating indicators on 
the economic systems actually implemented. However, this literature mostly concentrates on 
the enterprise (or micro) level in traditional OECD countries, categorizing countries between the 
extremes: liberal market economies and controlled market economies. It largely neglects the 
role of the government spending, the transition of former socialist countries and developing 
countries, and the political process behind the choice of an economic system.  
We broaden the perspective by combining the Varieties-of-Capitalism with the Worlds-of-
Welfare-States literature in order to provide a comprehensive view on government activities in 
transition. With the perspective of our contribution to WWWforEurope, we concentrate 
especially on social welfare, innovation systems, macro stability, and, of course, how these 
aspects work together (or not) and are explained by the political background.  
We will a cluster analysis for OECD and European transition countries and comparative country 
studies on Slovakia and Hungary. These countries are of special relevance because they 
represent extreme cases (Slovakia: significant switch in transition path towards star performer, 
Hungary: muddling towards problem case). One part of the comparative work concentrates on 
the comparison of Slovakia with other new EU members that also face to challenge of state 
building after dissolution of one or the other sort (Czech Rep. and the Baltics). The other part of 
the comparative work concentrates on Hungary in comparison with the other EU-CEECs. A 
broad based comparison will most likely be possible on available data only. The possibility for 
deeper qualitative comparisons will have to be determined during the project. The comparative 
components will focus on the macroeconomic background (Slovakia) and the welfare state 
(Hungary) respectively.  
Cluster analysis (initially forseen for MS25) and comparative country studies allows us to draw 
conclusions for the EU by providing a first comparison of the position of CEECs with respect to 
the “old” EU members, most interestingly the southern crisis countries that are often categorized 
into a form called mixed market economies with sometimes contradicting institutional set ups. 
Do CEECs converge towards prototype models or do they (still) constitute own models?  
   
 
Contribution to the Project 
Lessons from CEECs seem to be highly relevant for the transition of the EU towards 2020 goals 
because of the most profound and ambitious transfer of institutions in recent history which took 
place in these countries at different speed. Concerning the economic and especially the welfare 
system, the literature on varieties of capitalism has established two prototypes of capitalism – 
(LME) and Coordinated Market Economies (CME), a categorization that already divides EU-15 
in two groups (anglo-saxon vs. continental). MS23 provides a first set of lessons based on 
comparative country studies by asking if CEECs are converging towards prototypes of 
capitalistic systems or rather establish new types of capitalism.  
Keywords: EU integration, innovation, innovation policy, institutional reforms, macroeconomic 
disequilibria, market economy with adjectives, social development, welfare reform, welfare state 
Jel codes: P10, P51 
 
1. Introduction  
Lessons from EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) are highly relevant for the 
transition of the EU towards 2020 goals because of the most profound and ambitious transfer of 
institutions in recent history which took place in these countries at different speed. Concerning the 
economic and especially the welfare system, the literature on Varieties of Capitalism (VoC; see, e.g., 
Hall/Soskice 2001) has established two prototypes of capitalism – Liberal Market Economies (LME) 
and Coordinated Market Economies (CME), a categorization that already divides EU-15 in two groups 
(anglo-saxon vs. continental). The interim report provides a first set of lessons based on comparative 
country studies by asking if CEECs are converging towards prototypes of capitalistic systems or rather 
establish new types of capitalism. 
The general idea is to follow the Varieties-of-Capitalism literature on generating indicators on the 
economic systems actually implemented. However, the literature on VoC has largely concentrated on 
leading OECD countries and on micro issues like inter-company relations, corporate governance, 
training/education, industrial relations. This only touches issues relevant for the design of welfare 
states and gives rather low weight to government interventions (especially spending). The discussion 
in the literature on Worlds of Welfare States (WWS; e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990) is still to be 
integrated. As argued by Kitschelt (2006), there is also a possible or impossible trinity of 
welfare/equality, innovation/growth, and macro stability. Arguably, welfare/equality is often said to 
be neglected by liberal market economies, while fiscal stability is not given sufficient weight in 
coordinated market economies. In addition, the discussion mainly does not consider the context of 
development and transition.  
We attempt to broaden the VoC perspective by a comprehensive view on government activities in 
transition. At the same time, with the perspective of our contribution to WWWforEurope, we 
concentrate especially on social welfare, innovation systems, macro stability, and, of course, how 
these aspects work together (or not). 
In order to draw conclusions for the EU we provide a first comparison of the position of CEECs with 
respect to the “old” EU members, most interestingly the southern crisis countries that are often 
categorized into a form called mixed market economies with sometimes contradicting institutional 
set ups. Do CEECs move in this direction or have they avoided possible traps during transition? In 
Section 2, this will be done on the basis of a macro cluster analysis. 
While internationally comparable data provides a solid background for the analysis of economic 
systems in CEECs, some aspects are to be deepened in comparative country studies. The comparative 
country studies with focus on Slovakia and Hungary respectively look at two strikingly different 
transition paths and at the political economy of building capitalist welfare states from two angles: 
- Slovakia, in a way, constitutes a case of shock therapy, disintegration, and, finally 
convergence, which allows analyzing a possible/impossible trinity in building up a welfare 
state in a (relatively) low income country. In this country study, the main focus will be on the 
trinity providing also comparable macro data. It will be possible to analyze to which extent 
the impact of transition on social indicators is stronger compared to other countries in the 
region and, consequently, to which extent Slovakia is a specific case. 
- Hungary, to the contrary, had a rather favorable starting point as one of the most liberal 
socialist economies but ended up with rather strong political and economic crises. In this 
country study, the main focus will be on the link between polity and business, comparing the 
variety of explanations in the post-socialist context. While the macro trinity issue will be 
considered as well, the study goes more into details. Because of the qualitative content, 
comparisons are more restricted and based on the literature. 
Section 3 provides the main results of the comparative country study on Slovakia (see also 
Background Paper 1). Section 4 gives the main results of the comparative country study on Hungary 
(see also Background Paper 2) but starts out with a discussion on a specific economic model of CEECs 
(details are to be found in Background Paper 3).  
 
  
2. VoC and WWS in CEECs – Cluster Analysis 
As described and analyzed by the Varieties-of-Capitalism (VoC) approach (see, e.g., Hall and Soskice 
2001), different market regimes, i.e. capitalist variations, are characterized by different institutional 
matrices in the economy.  These institutional environments and arrangements provide incentive 
structures for the behavior of firms, households and also policymakers. Moreover, these different 
institutional settings reflect, influenced by distinct incentive patterns, different economic and 
societal preferences with respect to the role of the government in the economy.  
The VoC literature classifies market economies into two polar types of capitalism. In Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs), coordination is primarily characterized by price signals and formal contracting in 
competitive markets. In contrast, Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) are largely driven by 
specific non-market institutions which play critical roles and influence processes of strategic 
interaction. This analytical division is conceived as a bipolar continuum on which countries cluster as 
follows: CMEs include the Scandinavian countries, Continental European countries and Japan. LMEs 
comprise the USA, the UK, Ireland, Canada, New Zealand and Australia (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Despite increased international competition due to globalization processes as well as despite 
domestic adjustment pressure due to demographic changes, there has not been a convergence of 
different economic regimes towards a universal economic order (Schustereder 2010). LMEs and 
CMEs have adjusted, but not converged. Each regime has largely maintained its peculiarities. This 
confirms Hall and Soskice’s (2001) hypothesis that institutional convergence will be unlikely. 
Until recently, however, the VoC literature suffered from two shortcomings: It has concentrated on 
advanced economies (especially in an OECD context), and, although pointing at the importance of 
governance issues, neglected the role of the state. However, there is an increasing number of 
publications which seek to explain capitalist variations in less developed, emerging, or transition 
economies within a VoC framework (see, e.g., Ahrens and Jünemann 2007, Lane and Myant 2007). In 
those countries, especially formal institutions tend to change at a broader scale and a faster pace 
than in the OECD world, and governments have played influential roles in initiating and enforcing 
formal institutional change.  Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock (2009) find that, for much of the second half of 
the twentieth century, the economic weight of the state in middle-income Latin American countries 
(particularly as regards economic outreach and social policy interventions) seemed to approach that 
of socialist countries in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the overall growth strategies contain a 
mixture of liberal capitalism as well as an emphasis on state supported late industrialization. Hence, 
preferences for the mode of governance seem to matter but the policy mix in developing countries 
may not neatly fit with categorizations established in the VoC discourse. 
There are also a few papers which started to focus on the role of the state. Amable and Azizi (2009) 
and Schustereder (2010) observe that LMEs usually exhibit more limited social protection, while 
CMEs and particularly social-democratic (Nordic or Scandinavian) welfare regimes are based on 
governance structures which provide significantly more generous social protection both in kind and 
monetary terms.  
One explanation is provided by a direct link between labour market institutions and the welfare state 
as analyzed in the literature on Worlds of Welfare States (WWS; e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990). 
According to Amable and Azizi (2009), the competitiveness of LMEs  relies on activities which require 
workers to acquire general skills. Because of these non-specific skills, workers are conceived to 
switch relatively easily between jobs. Hence, there is no specific need for protection. On the 
contrary, the competitiveness of CMEs is typically based on activities which favour the appropriation 
of firm- or sector-specific skills. In such an environment, a generous social protection system may act 
(ex-ante) as an incentive for workers to acquire the needed specific skills. Hence, “LMEs (…) 
sharpened market mechanisms, while … (CMEs) … tended to cushion citizens against the effects of 
market adjustment, moving more slowly to make changes to social protection …” (Hall and Gingerich 
(2004: 36)). 
There is, however, also an argument which goes well beyond a narrow focus on the welfare system 
and related spending for social protection. Lijphart (1999) points out that CMEs usually have a 
consensus-oriented political system, in which large (at times heterogeneous) coalitions ensure 
government support. Such regimes provide an institutional setting in which vested interest groups 
participate in, or indirectly influence, policy making. Thereby, interest groups help to generate a 
consensus between firms and unions to generate, extend, or at least maintain a developed welfare 
regime. On the contrary, LMEs are often based on majoritarian political regimes that favor two-party 
political competition as well as a pluralism of interest groups, while a relatively powerful government 
faces fragmented partners in the social realm. Finally, consensus-based systems with proportional 
representation may be conducive for a political center-left power which may be more inclined to 
establish and extend a welfare state regime than a centre-right wing political alliance which 
frequently exists in systems of majoritarian rule. 
Amable and Azizi (2009:4) conclude that the “consequences for macroeconomic policy, and more 
particularly for social policy, can be exemplified by the ‘common pool’ problem (…). Indeed, in 
countries with coalition governments, each member of the coalition may be prone to make public 
expenditures in different areas towards the specific groups which are supportive of its political party. 
Hence the tendency to ‘overspend’ and to produce ‘excessive’ deficits because of the given levels of 
governments’ resources (…)”. 
All in all, the literature on VoC has largely concentrated on leading OECD countries and on micro 
issues like inter-company relations, corporate governance, training/education, industrial relations. 
This only touches issues relevant for the design of welfare states but gives rather low weight to 
government interventions (especially spending). The insights of the WWS literature are still to be 
integrated. More specifically, , as argued by Kitschelt (2006), there is a possible or impossible trinity 
of welfare/equality, innovation/growth, and macro stability. Welfare/equality is often said to be 
neglected by liberal market economies, while fiscal stability is not given sufficient weight in 
coordinated market economies. In the same vein, EU enlargement criteria have also focused on 
competitiveness and stability in the first place, while – due to a lack of consensus – welfare and 
equality considerations have not been high on the list of conditions for entry into the EU nor for EU 
policy as such. 
In this paper, we analyze the evolution of economic systems in CEECs, i.e. European transition 
countries, on the basis of a modified and extended VoC (Varieties-of-Capitalism) approach. Rather 
than focusing on the micro level, we argue that economic systems are characterized by government 
activity in spending and/or regulating the economy and that policy should be evaluated in the 
context of performance. For doing this, we employ cluster analysis for European and OECD countries 
using broad macro indicators for policy and performance. In addition, we acknowledge for the 
transition aspect by looking at cluster history, i.e. cluster analysis for different time spans.  
As will be seen when discussing the results, emerging clusters are strikingly similar to the traditional 
ones, suggesting a high correlation between the variables used in these analyses. The use of macro 
data, however, allows us to include performance variables along the line suggested by Kitschelt 
(2006). In addition, this allows better cross-country comparisons because of data availability. 
We consider three variables measuring government activity,1
- Overall size of government incl. transfers, government enterprises, tax system, etc., 
 
- Transfer spending as a proxy for welfare related involvement, 
- Government regulations aggregated on the basis of sectoral regulation in trade, labour, 
capital markets, etc., 
  
                                                          
1 Variables for government activity have been taken from Economic Freedom of the World Report compiled by 
the Frazer Institute. 
As well as three sets of variables measuring whether countries succeeded in achieving2
- Equality in income as measured by the GINI index, 
 
- Stability measured by using fiscal debt, and 
- Welfare in terms of income perspectives, measured by innovation capacity.  
An important issue concerning the CEECs is of course convergence. This implies that, contrary to the 
traditional OECD analysis, we assume that cluster patterns may change over time with CEECs either 
forming own clusters or integrating themselves into OECD or Western EU clusters. Hence, different 
to other studies, we define periods for which we average our variables and provide a cluster history 
by performing cluster analysis for all periods in order to reveal potential convergence. Finally, 
principal component analysis reveals, which variables are driving the cluster results.3
Figure 1 – Clusters of Liberal and Coordinated Market Economies, 2007-09 (period average) 
   
 
Figure 1 shows the result of the cluster analysis for the most recent period, for which a full set of 
data was available. A first answer to the question whether or not there is a specific economic model 
for the CEECs is that it depends. If one allows for a level of heterogeneity where different varieties of 
coordinated market economies are to be distinguished, CEECs still form separate groups and are not 
integrated into the traditional OECD clusters. It is interesting to note that the macro level analysis is 
able to reveal the clusters highlighted in VoC and WWS literatures. Hence, there is a distinction 
                                                          
2 Data for performance variables is taken from World Bank (World Development Indicators in case of GINI 
index; KAM database in case of innovation variable). 
3 Concerning the Cluster Methodology ‘Euclidian Distance’ and the ‘Ward Method’ were chosen as dissimilarity 
measure and clustering algorithm. 
between three “traditional” groups of CEECs: Nordic, Continental, and MME, i.e. the Southern 
Europeans (except Spain). These groups are distinct from the Liberal group of LME countries.  
The macro analysis also reveals, however, that there are two distinct groups of CEECs, which cluster 
either with the CME-groups or with the LME-group. The fact that CEECs form two groups is also 
robust to the use of alternative performance variables but the distinction between a coordinated and 
a liberal group is most pronounced when using a forward looking measure of performance, i.e. 
innovation capacity.  At the same time, and this is the second answer to the question about a 
separate CEEC-model, moving up the cluster tree shows the integration of CEEC-groups with 
traditional groups. Hence, on a level of heterogeneity at which the traditional OECD world is divided 
into only two groups - CME and LME – CEECs become integrated (see Background Paper 3 for a more 
detailed discussion). 
Table 1 – Cluster History, 1995-2009 
  
 
As mentioned above, convergence is an important topic when talking about CEECs. Hence, cluster 
analysis was performed for the periods 2004-06, 2000-03, and for the year 1995 representing the 
first data available for our government variables. Table 1 reveals some rather stable groups but also 
convergence as well as divergence. The most stable groups are the Liberals, both traditional LME 
countries and the more liberal CEECs, mainly the Baltic countries. This also applies to a core group of 
Continental countries – Austria, France, Germany, and, to some extent, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and, for most of the time, for the MME group consisting of Southern European 
countries.  
Interestingly, and consistent with reform efforts in the region, the Nordic group diverged from a joint 
cluster with Continentals after 1995. For the group of CEECs, which tends towards a coordinated 
economic system, some convergence towards the Continental group happened in the context of 
accession. After the period 2004-06, however, these CEECs separated forming an own cluster. 
Overall, it seems that the distribution into clusters seems to be stabilizing somewhat but it is still too 
early to conclude that CEEC clusters will remain stable.  
The analysis of the driving variables for the cluster results reveals some additional insights. There are 
two main principal components:  
- PC1 is negatively correlated with government spending (overall and transfers) and equality 
- PC2 is positively correlated with innovation but negatively correlated with regulation 
Figure 2 sorts the clusters revealed in Figure 1 into the a PC1/PC2-space. This reveals some 
interesting insights: 
- There are two “worlds of redistribution”: the traditional LMEs joined by the more liberal 
CEECs, which spent less and have a higher degree of inequality compared to all the other 
groups. This confirms a positive interdependence between spending and distribution. Some 
groups of countries have a preference for equality and others do not. 
- At the same time, there is also a distinction according to a regulation/innovation mix within 
these two “worlds of redistribution”. Clearly, the Nordic countries are distinct from the other 
CMEs by revealing a rather low degree of regulation going together with a high degree of 
innovation. While this is not an analysis of causality, it fits to the argument made by Kitschelt 
that it is especially the Continental group of CMEs facing a problem of inefficiency. 
Regulation and spending constitute rather complements than substitutes. On the contrary, 
Nordic countries are running large (redistributive) welfare states but increasingly liberal 
regulation regimes.  
 Figure 2 – Principal Components Analysis, 2007-09 (period averages) 
 
 
- If we assume some causality for lower regulation allowing for higher innovative capacity, 
comparing Nordic and Liberal groups in Figure 2 seems to reveal some kind of “unavoidable 
trade-off” involved in having (efficient) redistribution by a welfare state. 
- While the CEEC countries on the left hand side are distributed somewhere in the area of the 
Continental group, the Southern Europeans again are quite distinct. Except Spain, the MMEs 
seem to represent the worst mix of high regulation/low innovation together with a rather 
undetermined spending/equality mix. As was revealed by the cluster analysis in general, 
CEECs do not mix up in such a scenario. 
Concerning the countries, we focus on in the following comparative country studies, Slovakia and 
Hungary, it is interesting to note that they reveal a rather similar almost average performance with 
respect to the innovation/regulation-equality/spending mix. This is remarkable because, as indicated 
above and detailed below, the countries are coming from very different backgrounds and 
experiences. Similarity implies that the two countries are not quite average countries within their 
clusters. However, it also exemplifies the fact that Slovakia has made substantial progress compared 
to its starting position as a low income country which had to cope with nation building and a lagged 
transition process.  
3. Comparative Country Study Slovakia 
Contrary to Western Europe, where market oriented economic systems developed over several 
centuries, transition in CEECs from centrally planned economies to market economies took place in 
considerably shorter time. Some CEECs started to introduce economic reforms towards a market 
economy already from the early 1980s (Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia). However, in other countries no 
reforms were undertaken at this stage. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, some nations (the Baltic 
States, Slovakia, Slovenia) used the opportunity for regaining their independent statehood. Hence, 
these countries faced a double challenge: 1. to introduce economic reforms leading to a market 
economy, 2. to build the basic economic institutions needed for managing an independent state 
economy. There was a belief that it is possible to implement capitalist institutions in CEECs from 
above and in a relatively short period of time. However, reality proves to be much more complicated 
– transition took a longer time and it was much more difficult and complex. Given the legacy of 
central planning, economic transition of CEECs was path-dependent and the old institutions were 
combined with the new ones.  
Although joining the EU as soon as possible became the key external factor of accelerating transition 
of the CEECs, discrepancies arose in each country as regards the priorities and pace of the reforms to 
be undertaken. In some of the CEECs including Slovakia, the supporters of more radical reforms (the 
so-called “shock therapy”) enforced this approach despite its big negative impact in the short-term 
(output fall, unemployment and recession). Other countries (e.g. Hungary, Slovenia) took a more 
“gradualist” approach, in which reformers implemented step-by-step reforms, with the aim to avoid 
drastic changes in output, employment and welfare.  
Similar to OECD countries, instead of one variety of capitalism several varieties developed in CEECs. 
However, legacy of central planning constituted different starting points and different challenges for 
CEECs compared to countries in Western Europe. The heritage of the communist pasts, lower levels 
of development and various informal institutions mean that there is no close fit with the ideal types 
used for analysing and comparing mature market economies (Lane-Myant 2006).  
Hence, the VoC approach can only be restrictively, flexibly and sensitively applied to post-communist 
countries, the mechanical application of the VoC can be misleading. Although some features may 
already be clear, these countries are still undergoing changes leading to a variety of capitalism with 
the shape difficult to predict. In addition, institutions can be changed more easily in transition 
economies because of weaker enforcement compared to developed economies. Hence, more 
alternatives for capitalist trajectories exist in transition countries, which can develop towards LME, 
CME or a mixed form of both (Mendelski 2008).  
Slovakia was labelled late comer at the beginning of transition; however, it seemed to become a kind 
of star performer in the first decade of the 21st century. Although the pace of reforms has slowed 
down few years ago, the Slovak economy provides a good example of a relatively successful 
transition. In Slovakia a local variety of capitalism with specific features of capital control and with 
lower productivity level developed. Dual economy and reliance on bank finance are other specific 
features of capitalism in this country. Dual economy includes a) on one side economy represented by 
highly effective, export oriented and technologically advanced branches of multinational companies 
and by international banks, and b) on the other side several large companies and many small and 
medium enterprises (SME) in domestic ownership, with SME having lower efficiency and limited 
personal, technological and financial sources. R&D system is underfinanced in Slovakia and the role 
of the business sector is relatively weak. From this point of view, Slovakia would fit into the 
Mediterranean model. 
During the socialist era, Leninist type of social policy, universally oriented at a wide group of working 
people and their families, was conducted in CEECs. Nowadays welfare state in CEECs is a combination 
of more types of welfare states, depending on the sector examined. According to Farkas (2011), 
CEECs cannot be put into one single welfare system, social protection in Poland, Hungary and 
Slovenia fits the Continental model, and the others have the characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon 
model. 
Development of social policy in Slovakia has been turbulent after 1989 and represents still not 
sufficiently investigated area. According to classification of Korpi and Palme (1997) and based on 
analyses of institutional development, labour market policy in Slovakia could be placed between the 
encompassing model and the targeted model, since the principle of definition of unemployment 
benefits is uniform for all people; active searching for a job (or participation in labour market 
programs) is condition for registration and help from the state; and help is targeted and temporary 
(Gerbery and Kvapilová 2006). The current pension system in Slovakia shifts a big part of 
responsibility from state (Social Insurance Company) to the market (private pension funds 
management companies) and individuals. The pension system is supposed to develop towards the 
combination of the encompassing model, conditioned by participation in the labour market and by 
compulsory membership in the system; and the basic security model. The system of social aid is very 
close to the targeted model, with some features of the basic security model. Although it is very 
difficult to identify which out of the welfare state models Slovakia belongs to, in general, we can 
conclude that during transition the Slovak welfare state moved from universalism towards minimum 
social security and targeted measures. Significance of passive policy has decreased relatively - 
benefits were minimized, criteria for receiving benefits were tightened, their real value decreased 
and the period of receiving them was shortened. 
The political pressures for neo-liberal restructuring could be observed all around Eastern Europe, 
however, election of a right-wing party representing these groups was one of the pre-conditions for 
neo-liberal restructuring to take place. These conditions were fulfilled in Slovakia after 2002, which 
became an emblematic case of neo-liberal restructuring and corresponds to the ‘minimal welfare 
state’. However, the neo-liberal restructuring took place only after the imbalances of the old systems 
had been reduced and stabilized in 1998 - 2002. Further development could be either towards the 
‘European’ social model or could continue in the neo-liberal direction (Myant-Drahokoupil 2010).  
From the perspective of capitalism development in Slovakia, the federal transition strategy (first 
stage of transition – 1990-1992) focused on implementation of liberal market oriented measures. 
However, their negative effects on the Slovak economy resulted in favourable conditions for creation 
of the so called “own way of transition”. This was implemented in the second period (1993-1998), 
which is difficult to classify in terms of standard VoC categories. The experiment with the own way of 
transition failed and led to significant macroeconomic imbalances. The privatisation process was 
highly influenced by political decisions, with the objective to create the so called “Slovak capital 
stratum”, composed of enterprises owned solely by the Slovak entrepreneurs. However, the majority 
of enterprises under control of these entrepreneurs were knowingly led into bankruptcy (so called 
“tunnelling”). The lack of relevant legal procedures and laws, the existing links between politicians 
and entrepreneurs made this behaviour possible, without any significant legal sanctions. As a result, 
the low inflow of FDI, international isolation of the Slovak Republic, expansive fiscal policy and 
restrictive monetary policy created significant macroeconomic imbalances.4
The economic policy in the third stage of transition (1998-2002) implemented large number of 
market oriented reforms, which created the foundation for even more market oriented reforms in 
the following period. Despite the composition of the government parties (left–centre–right coalition), 
the main principles of the reforms pushed the Slovak economy closer to liberal market economies. 
This tendency was intensified in the fourth transition period (2002-2006) under the new centre-right 
government. The reform and principles of the social system, the tax reform, privatisation of state 
owned enterprises and the generally negative attitude toward state interventions and state 
ownership were the most prominent features of economic policy. Despite the liberal market 
  
                                                          
4 While the first and partially the second stage of transition were managed by the IMF and the World Bank, the European 
Commission played the key role in the following stages, given integration efforts of the Slovak Republic. After EU accession, 
the Slovak government had relatively free hands when deciding on further progress of economic development. 
orientation, the importance of attracting FDI and competition among the CEEC countries in this area 
forced the government to provide substantial investment subsidies.  
In 2006, a new centre-left government was appointed, which basically accepted and only slightly 
amended the social-economic reforms implemented by the previous government. However, these 
reforms have been more significantly modified after the appointment of the new left-wing 
government in 2012. The present development suggests that the effects of the reforms conducted in 
1998–2006 are fading. The future development of the Slovak economy will depend also on a new set 
of reforms aimed at changes in the education system, R&D and innovation support, domestic SME 
support and implementation of extensive reforms in the public sector. Despite the recently 
implemented changes in economic policy, Slovakia still seems to be closer to LME than to CME and 
the future development will be again strongly dependent on the political cycle. According to Baláž 
(2006), as it is not possible to say which variety of capitalism is better than the others, it is also not 
possible to say whether the current variety of capitalism in Slovakia has good long term perspectives 
or not. 
To put the performance of Slovakia into the CEEC perspective, two analyses have been conducted 
comparing ten CEECs (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) with three benchmark countries (Germany as the case of CME, UK 
as LME and Italy as MME):  
- Analysis of selected policy variables (transfers and subsidies, size of government, regulation) 
and performance variables (Gini coefficient, innovation, fiscal debt), on which the cluster 
study has been based. Using a different method, this analysis allows for an alternative view 
on the cluster data.  
- Analysis of selected indicators representing the trinity of welfare/equality, 
innovation/growth/competitiveness and macroeconomic stability, based on available time 
series and data from the Eurostat database.5
Overall, these variations in method and data allows for a kind of robustness check for the results of 
the cluster analysis and, at the same time, deeper insights into the transition. For both analyses, a 
scoring model has been developed, based on the average values of the respective indicators for all 
 This analysis is based on a broader set of 
indicators in order to provide a more detailed picture of performance in the CEECs.  
                                                          
5 Welfare/equality: employment rate, unemployment rate, long-term unemployment, Gini coefficient, COFOG - Social 
protection (% GDP), expenditure on social protection per inhabitant, in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate; 
Innovation/growth/competitiveness: gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP), patent applications to the European 
Patent Office per million inhabitants, GDP growth rate (Y-o-Y change), labour productivity per hour worked vs. EU average. 
Macroeconomic stability: current account balance (% of GDP), government deficit/surplus (% of GDP), general government 
gross debt (% of GDP), private debt (% of GDP), HICP inflation. Apart from the data sources of the cluster analysis presented 
in Section 2, data comes from Eurostat. 
13 countries. The model has the following specifications: The average values of individual indicators 
have been statistically distributed into 10 percentiles, which provided the necessary intervals for 
assigning points to countries. The points have been assigned to countries in descending order from 
10 to 1 (i.e. the country with best performance in the respective indicator receiving 10 points and the 
worst receiving 1 point).6
The analysis of the three policy variables and the three performance variables has revealed that 
while the countries in the CEEC CME group (labelled according to the results of the cluster study) 
reached higher/the same scores in the policy variables than in the performance variables, with 
Hungary being a slight exception; in the CEEC LME group, the score in the performance variables is 
higher than that in the policy variables in all countries included (figure 3). Basically, the results of the 
CEEC CME countries are closer to those of Germany and Italy and the CEEC LME are comparable with 
the UK. It can be concluded that the analysis provides support for the results achieved in the cluster 
study. Interestingly, the scores of Slovakia and Hungary are also very similar. In order to compare 
their performance in a more depth, the analysis of a broader set of indicators of the trinity has been 
accomplished. 
 The total score for each country for the sets of policy and performance 
variables (first analysis) or for individual dimensions of the trinity (second analysis) has been 
calculated as the sum of the points assigned to the country for indicators in the respective set of 
variables or in the respective dimension of the trinity. 
Figure 3  – Policy and performance variables in CEEC groups and benchmark countries (percent of 
maximum values in total sample) 
 
 
Based on the data and methodology used in the second analysis, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, 
followed by Estonia are the most successful countries among the CEECs in terms of performance with 
respect to all three dimensions of the trinity, with Estonia lagging in terms of welfare (figure 4). In 
                                                          
6 In case of the policy variables, assigning 10 points means the most transfers and subsidies, the biggest government, the 
most regulation. 
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general, the Baltic States are rather unequal and socially exclusive, Slovenia represents the opposite 
extreme and the Visegrad countries are between these two extremes. By many authors, Slovenia 
(CME) and Estonia (LME) are considered the most successful transition countries with two diverse 
but coherent institutional systems. Slovenia achieved balance between macroeconomic stability, 
competitiveness and welfare. One of the factors of the success of Slovenia is its exceptional legacy, as 
the country inherited from the former Yugoslavia a unique enterprise ownership structure.  
Estonia and other two Baltic States reveal the best results in terms of macroeconomic stability 
among the CEECs, Latvia and Lithuania only before the crisis. The goal of national independence can 
explain why macroeconomic stability became a priority for these states. They have enjoyed strong 
political support for reforms towards the market economy in contrast with many other countries, as 
radical economic reforms were crucial for the defence of national independence. The Czech Republic 
is also often considered one of the most successful socialist countries to have transited to capitalism, 
which was confirmed by the results of our analysis. A very important factor for the relative success of 
the transformation process in the Czech Republic was the early rejection of a “third way” between 
socialism and market economy. As regards R&D, Slovenia, Estonia and the Czech Republic represents 
slight exceptions from underfinanced systems in the CEECs. 
 
Figure 4  – Performance in CEEC groups and benchmark countries (percent of maximum values in 
total sample) 
 
 
When compared to the benchmark countries, the results for Slovenia mostly fit those of Germany 
and surprisingly also those of the UK. In less extent, the same is the case of the Czech Republic (with 
the most evident difference in dimension of innovation and competiveness) and Estonia (with worse 
performance in welfare dimension). Other CEECs are closer to Italy, with Slovakia lagging behind 
mostly in welfare. Hungary has performed better than Slovakia only in welfare/equality dimension 
but lags behind Slovakia mostly in terms of macroeconomic stability. 
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The results of the Slovak economy in the respective dimensions of the trinity are mixed, which 
implies that Slovakia performs about average within the CEEC countries, with the following strengths: 
private debt, general government gross debt, GDP growth, labour productivity and Gini coefficient. A 
still high unemployment rate (in particular long term unemployment and unemployment of young 
people) and low gross domestic expenditure on R&D represent serious weaknesses. 
As can be seen from Figure 4, the results of the trinity in Slovakia are closer to those of Estonia (LME) 
than those of Slovenia (CME), which represent two extreme cases in the literature. This is in line with 
the results of the cluster analysis, where Slovakia and Estonia belong to the group of CEEC LME. 
According to the analysis of the trinity, both countries have focused less on welfare/equality than on 
other two dimensions of the trinity. On the contrary, the results of Hungary fit more those of 
Slovenia, with a stronger emphasis on welfare dimension. These economies belong to the group of 
CEEC CME according to results of the cluster analysis. However, as regards the trinity, the overall 
results of Hungary are significantly worse than those of Slovenia, which is not the case of Slovakia, 
when compared with Estonia. 
Based on the analysis of the selected indicators, Slovakia does not seem to be a special case. 
However, comparisons between countries using quantitative indicators reveal only part of the story. 
From the view of the institutional developments and in particular the pace of the liberal reforms 
implemented in the beginning of this millennium, Slovakia has been labelled a star performer. 
However, the way of managing transition in Slovakia is characterised by several mistakes which 
resulted in economic losses as well as decreasing confidence in transition process. In the first stages 
of transition, mistakes and shortcomings include: 
- The speed of transition. The shock therapy proved to be appropriate for few reforms (price 
liberalisation), however, in some areas this approach was not feasible (privatisation, 
restructuring the enterprise sector) or it was even damaging (liberalisation of foreign trade 
relations). Liberalisation of foreign trade was conducted at once and in an asymmetric way. 
Privatization process, focusing on speed and range, suffered from several weaknesses; legal 
environment and institutional framework for business activities was insufficient. 
- A late start of building institutional framework of the market economy. The neoclassical 
conception, which minimized the role of institutions in the economy, dominated in Slovakia 
in the first stage of transition. Later economists supporting radical reforms enriched their 
approach by institutional issues of transition. However, it took more than a decade to build 
at least the basic elements of a new system of formal institutions in Slovakia. 
- Misunderstanding of the role of the state in the market economy in general and in transition 
process in particular. The change of the role of the state became a strategic task of transition. 
However, many functions of the state were underestimated and it took a rather long time to 
define the new tasks of the state in the market economy.  
Overall, the transition process, coupled with continued legislative and institutional changes and 
political controversies, has created foundations of the market economy in Slovakia. However, its 
design is still not satisfactory. Although the transition of Slovakia and other CEECs countries towards 
market economies represents a unique process, identification of its successful sides as well as 
problems and shortcomings may be useful for other transition processes. As the Slovak experience 
with transition shows, it is crucial to build well-functioning institutions, in particular the formal ones, 
already in the initial stage of any transition. Further, both too slow and too fast implementation of 
reforms can result in a slowdown or even stoppage of the transition process. At the same time, a 
high pace of reforms should not be achieved at the expense of their quality and long term 
sustainability, since numerous additional changes of institutions can decrease confidence in the 
authors of respective reforms. Moreover, the experience of Slovakia shows how reform strategies 
and the parameters of adopted reforms are linked to the political cycle. In the periods of right-wing 
or centre-right governments, liberal policy direction tends to be significant. However, the change of 
the government to the left-wing one or centre-left one usually results in more or less significant 
changes in the policy direction, which slow down, stop or even return the economy from the way 
towards a liberal market economy.  
 
4. Comparative Country Study Hungary 
The VoC literature has developed a rather substantial knowledge base in the frames of comparative 
economics. For various countries and country groups important institutions were checked for 
similarity (Hall and Soskice 2001, Amable 2003, Sapir 2006). The most frequently analyzed areas were 
capital and labour markets, product markets, welfare institutions/social protection, innovation 
systems, political stability/democracy, shadow economy/corruption. There is a far reaching 
consensus among the scholars concerning the four basic types of capitalist models in Europe: The 
Nordic, the Liberal, the Continental and the Mediterranean (MME) models, which have also been 
confirmed by the macro cluster analysis in Section 2.  
After the transition of Central and Eastern Europe from central planning to market economy these 
countries also became targets of research in the frames of the VoC literature. Many papers tried to 
fit the individual transition economies into one or another existing models of capitalism (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2007, Csaba 2007, Lane 2007, King 2007). Research results were rather contradictory and 
problematic. Not only the lack of coinciding classifications for the single countries is embarrassing, 
but also the fact, that every single country shows up very unique mixtures of the elements of the four 
classic models. The appearance of conflicting institutional solutions made transition especially 
difficult in some countries, since the lack of consistency frequently destroyed the effects of one or 
another institution. Hence, institutions became and remained rather weak allowing rent seeking and 
other perverse behaviour rather large room in transition economies.  
Those scholars intending to classify transition economies into the existing modelling frames 
frequently came to the conclusion that due to the lack of consistency among the investigated 
institutions a unique Eastern European model of capitalism could also be existing (EC 2008; 
Rodrigues, 2009). While some researchers restricted their work on one or few important aspects of 
capitalist models, up till now there was one comprehensive paper that analyzed the complex 
network of 5 important systemic elements of the models that could be captured by hard data in the 
10 new EU member states (see Farkas 2011). Nevertheless, this paper was also based on the 
common assumption that basic feature and institutions should be by definition the same in the 
specific Central and Eastern European model then in the classic models. This paper also concluded 
that the various countries had established different institutional mixes. Hence the question of a 
specific CEEC model is a rather controversial one.  
Besides the traditional institutions and linkages, also many transition specific features may play 
important role in the special arrangements of capitalism in CEECs that are usually not covered in the 
literature. Such features may be special geographic location between East and West, the legacies of 
the five decades long Soviet rule in the countries (in terms of social behaviour, economic structure 
and others), the strong role of FDI in creating competitive structures while development from local 
sources was much slower, dual structure of the economies, serious problems with job creation in the 
competitive sectors, the survival of state paternalism or the strong frictions in welfare institutions.  
The study on Hungary, therefore, focuses on the welfare state, the most important systemic element 
of capitalist models according to Sapir (2006). Research on the services of the welfare state provides 
valuable systemic information not only on the levels of social cohesion and fiscal discipline, but also 
on how social institutions work and on the relationship of polity and economy. In this regard,  the 
analysis of the history of the past 30 years of Hungarian welfare system also clearly shows the 
weaknesses of social-economic institutions, the ongoing presence of state paternalism and the 
continuous shuttling of polity between two poles: the more authoritarian, Eastern type of capitalism, 
and the more democratic and controlled Western type. 
The formation and development of the welfare state in the Central European region has brought 
much attention. However, there are studies that claim that the post-socialist welfare state does not 
follow a single pattern, Deacon (1992), for instance, has predicted that Eastern European countries 
will develop their social policies in the future into distinct regimes that may even lie outside the three 
worlds of welfare capitalism described by Esping-Andersen. The question of whether or not a specific 
CEEC model exists has been on the agenda for a long time. The transformation of the post-
communist welfare states involves communist legacies and strong elements of path-dependency as 
well as innovations and path-departing changes (Cook 2010).  
According to the performance of Hungary during the transition it has been presumed that it is easier 
to form market economy from reform socialism. Reform socialism’s adherent hope was this 
combination would unite all the real (or perceived) advantages of socialism and capitalism. The 
collapse of the communist regime was followed by rapid and radical changes, institutions of 
parliamentary democracy have emerged and produced laws to harmonize with the new system, at 
the end a market-conform legal infrastructure has been installed. While rapid development of the 
private sector can be observed, the reform of the pension system, medical care and social assistance 
systems has been laid aside for several years (Korna 1997). The Hungarian welfare state is often 
characterised by the term ’premature’ welfare state, coined by Kornai (1993, 1997) by calling the 
attention to the fact that the socialist regime did not result in a mature system, but a system with 
significant distortions.     
From the point of view of the welfare state, transition is not yet completed.  A fundamental feature 
of transition is its destructive nature (Csaba 1990, 1994) and the time horizon for transition was 
underestimated for the CEECs. While the institutional setup is compatible with market economies 
despite structural dissimilarities, the current crisis is an indicator of the incompleteness of 
institutional and regulatory change. Welfare systems in general and pension systems in particular are 
far from being sustainable (Csaba 2011).  
Welfare state generosity ratios put Hungary and the CEEC region on the map of the worlds of welfare 
states and allows to compare welfare state policies of the country groups (Figure 5).7
                                                          
7 Own calculations have been based on OECD SOCX dataset and World Bank data.  
 It can be 
concluded that the generosity ratio of them all have converged. By 2010, the Continental and the 
Nordic model have reached the same generosity level, meaning a significant cut and a salient 
increase respectively. The mean value of generosity for the Nordic countries went through significant 
decrease because Sweden and Norway radically cut back these types of expenditures, while for other 
Nordic countries this ratio has been increased. Coefficient variation of the Nordic generosity level is 
around 6 per cent compared to the overall 20 per cent value, generosity level in the Nordic countries 
is almost identical for 2011.   
 Figure 5 – Welfare State Generosity Ratios for Different Welfare State  
 
 
Since 2009, CEECs converging towards the Continental countries and the Liberal countries show 
similar generosity trends, slightly below 1.0, while the Mediterranean countries after significant 
improvement (as a consequence of the EU accession) started to cut back welfare expenditures 
enforced by the crisis. Liberal CEECs have the lowest level of generosity and the reduction of 
generosity was the most radical among them between 1995 and 2000, however afterwards they 
have started to increase generosity again.  
It is surprising that, since the 1990s, the coefficient variation has become significantly lower for all 
groups, except the CEECs. It can be understood as CEECs implement different policies in tackling the 
current crisis, while the other groups seem to be resistant to the crisis in perspective of the welfare 
state reforms. Among Continental CEECs, Hungary has reduced its generosity level to the greatest 
extent, having the lowest level within its group in 2011. The level of social protection has been still in 
sharp contradiction with the general level of development, resulted in too generous welfare system 
at the time of the transition and afterwards. In order to solve the above mentioned mismatch as a 
consequence of the inherited premature nature of the Hungarian welfare state, radical welfare 
reforms are needed.  Looking more closely into the specific features of the Hungarian welfare system 
exhibits a large extent of path-dependency with the period before transition providing the 
background and the most recent years (since 2011) being characterized by proposals rather than 
implementations.  
In case of Hungary path-dependency means that whatever change of the system took place, the 
country’s historical experiences are inseparable from the evolved model of the ‘Hungarian’ 
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capitalism. The Hungarian reform in 1968 can be considered as the most significant, despite all of its 
controversies leading to an increase of production and a rising standard of living (Muraközy 2008). 
The market reforms from the early eighties led to marketization which significantly increased both 
aggregate and individual-specific uncertainty; as compensation, the state did not hesitate to embark 
on generous welfare programmes. Welfare services became tools of the short-sighted state elites for 
compensating the losers of the economic reforms. As a consequence of these reform programmes, 
generous welfare spending became and is still an untouchable part of social rights, making the 
implementation of necessary reforms even more difficult from a political point of view (Benczes 
2011).  
From the problems and shortcomings of the Hungarian transition, which still influence the economic 
performance today, a few concluding remarks can be drawn:  
The speed of transition in Hungary is often picked up as an example of gradualism. Although, e.g., the 
bankruptcy law of 1992 may represent a classic case of a big bang approach, even this reform 
contained some sort of gradualism (Carmignani 2003) and is often cited as a prime example of 
gradualism (Condon and Dervis 1993) based on the lack of shock therapy compared to countries like 
Poland, Bulgaria or Russia. In the context of post-socialist transition gradualism was applied to avoid 
political conflict, it was equalled to timidity and unwillingness to change (Csaba 2011). The overall 
unique feature of the Hungarian transformation can be described as “transformation without 
stabilisation” (Csaba 1995: 195). To link Hungary’s experience to the debate on the speed of the 
transition, Benczes (2011) claim that the gradualist character of the Hungarian transformation was 
not the result of a conscious decision of the freely elected government, but a historically determined 
path dependent outcome of a two-decade long reform process which culminated in the political 
change of 1989. The early years of the Hungarian transformation, however, were burdened with 
ambiguity and a lack of coherence in policy decisions. Finally, the culture and routine of gradualism à 
la Hungary led to the resistance to shock-therapy. Consequently, welfare expenditures are still very 
high and above OECD average, although the gap has started to close since 2010. The citizens perceive 
worsening quality of public services despite the high costs. Creating welfare state generosity ratio, it 
can be concluded that Hungary ranks in the middle, however in general generosity has been 
significantly decreased. In addition, there is a lack of systematic comprehensive reform of the big 
allocation systems which has been accompanied with hectic changes of the taxation system. 
In case of Hungary the role of the local governmental system and the gender dimension are to be 
highlighted as special features. As far as the social insurance system is concerned, the local 
governments are responsible for the provision of the services which resulted in the indebtedness 
problem of the local tier. In 2011, a reform of the local governmental system took place to handle 
this process. The problem of the welfare system is the fulfilment of public services in a better quality 
and different structure, e.g. the share of education is considerably lower in Hungary than the OECD 
average. Equal access to public services has to be ensured, however the fragmented local 
governmental structure hinders implementation. Without change in the financing system, the 
current system remains unsustainable.  
To dampen the negative labour market consequences of transition, government-supported pension 
policies were intended to mitigate the effects of declining labour demand. Most people leaving the 
labour market became eligible to some social provision, such as old age pension, disability pension, 
or maternity allowance. By 1995, the share of benefit recipients among the working age population 
reached 31 per cent. Pension schemes were used to reduce open unemployment since the mid-
1980s and after the transition this practice was expanded. This compensation process carried out by 
the extension of pension schemes could dampen the negative effects of the transition, however in 
the long run it has become the cause for the unsustainability of the pension system. By socio-
economic transition the long-run evaluation of any compensation scheme is a key issue for managing 
sustainability in the long run. 
Transition had a specific impact on women. One of the most crucial elements of these changes are 
the gender specific differences of labour market participation. As a consequence of the transition, 
high unemployment and economic insecurity have affected women more, undermining the previous 
dual breadwinner model. Women’s labour market employment rates have fallen dramatically. 
Labour market participation is a key measure of gender inequality, employment among women 
dropped dramatically in all CEECs. However, gender-specific discrepancy in employment rates is 
lower in all CEECs (except the Czech Republic) than in the Western EU countries. Hungary’s situation 
(beside Poland) is special because female employment is the lowest. In general we can conclude that 
in the CEE countries the end of state socialism has brought diminishing support for women’s labour 
market participation (Pascall and Kwak 2010: 117). 
The following general findings can be drawn from the analysis of welfare state reform in Hungary:  
- The temporary cut in the affluent welfare expenditures, without any notable structural 
changes, are counter-incentives of the successful long-run stabilization.  
- The initial favourable starting point is no guarantee for success in the long run. There are 
path-dependent trajectories. 
- The welfare system can/could not help to solve the worsening social and income problems 
following the change of the political system.  
- Hungary is one of the worst-hit countries of the current financial crisis among the CEECs. The 
deteriorating economic performance of the country has its historical roots. A high ratio of 
redistribution, a high and persistent deficit and accelerated indebtedness are the 
consequences of the communist and the post-communist period. 
- Building up a modern and efficient market-driven welfare state in post-communist 
economies requires decades for reaching political consensus in different approaches (health, 
housing, education, research, etc.) and developing institutional and legal framework. Even 
the most advanced CEECs are at the very beginning of this process, and low quality of 
political debates and weak political elites can be described as the major obstacles on this 
way. In general at any socio-economic transition the correct configuration of the time frame 
is a key factor in order to avoid unrealistic expectations and growing resistance in the long 
run.   
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